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In the current economic crisis, ￿scal policy is widely seen to play a key role in
stabilizing demand and output. A large part of the debate on the ￿scal policy re-
sponse to the crisis has focused on discretionary policy action in the form of ￿scal
stimulus packages. But there is a second source of ￿scal expansion in an economic
crisis: the workings of automatic stabilizers. Automatic stabilizers are usually de-
￿ned as those elements of ￿scal policy which mitigate output ￿ uctuations without
discretionary government action (see, e.g., Eaton and Rosen (1980) or Auerbach
and Feenberg (2000)). Some observers have argued that automatic stabilizers may
provide a contribution to demand stabilization which is as important as active ￿scal
policy measures. For example, J￿rgen Stark, member of the European Central Bank
directorate, recently claimed that "automatic stabilization accounts for 50% of the
￿scal stimulus in Germany over the next 2 years."1
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks
on household demand essentially depends on two factors. Firstly, the tax and trans-
fer system determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates
into a change in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional
income tax with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of one hundred Euros
leads to a decline in disposable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs
40% of the shock to gross income. A progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger
stabilizing e⁄ect. Secondly, the link between current disposable income and current
demand for goods and services is crucial. If the income shock is perceived as tran-
sitory and current demand depends on some concept of permanent income, and if
households can borrow, their demand will not change. In this case, the impact of
automatic stabilizers on current demand would be equal to zero. Things are dif-
ferent, though, if households are liquidity constrained. In this case, their current
expenditures do depend on disposable income so that automatic stabilizers play a
role.
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the contribution of automatic stabi-
lizers to overall ￿scal expansion and demand stabilization, and to compare their
magnitude in Europe and the US. We analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers
using microsimulation models for 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US
1Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on May 20th 2009.
1(TAXSIM).2 In our baseline simulation, we only take into account personal income
taxes (at all government levels), social insurance contributions as well as payroll
taxes paid by employees, and transfers to private households like, e.g., unemploy-
ment bene￿ts.3 Computations are done according to the tax bene￿t rules which
were in force before 2008 in order to avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from
any policy responses after the start of the crisis. As a measure of automatic sta-
bilization, we use the normalized tax change as in Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).
This indicator relates the shock absorption by the tax and transfer system to the
overall size of the income shock. In the example given above, the normalized tax
change would be equal to 0.4, which means that the automatic stabilizers of the tax
and transfer system would absorb 40% of the shock to gross income.
We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment.
The ￿rst is a proportional decline in household gross income by 5% (income shock).
This is the usual way of modeling shocks in simulation studies analyzing automatic
stabilizers. However, economic downturns typically a⁄ect households asymmetri-
cally, with some households losing their jobs and su⁄ering a sharp decline in income
and other households being much less a⁄ected, as wages are usually rigid in the short
term. We therefore consider a second macro shock where some households become
unemployed, so that the unemployment rate increases by ￿ve percentage points
(unemployment shock). After identifying the e⁄ects of these shocks on disposable
income, we use methods developed by Zeldes (1989) to estimate the prevalence of
credit constraints among households. On this basis, we calculate how the stabiliza-
tion of disposable income translates into demand stabilization.
Our analysis leads to the following main results. In the case of an income shock,
approximately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the
EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 32%. This is surprising because automatic stabi-
lizers in Europe are usually perceived to be drastically higher than in the US. Our
results qualify this view to some extent, at least as far as proportional shocks on
2The simulation approach allows us to investigate the causal e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of shocks
on household disposable income, holding everything else constant and therefore avoiding endogene-
ity problems (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). We can hence single out the role of automatic
stabilization which is not possible in an ex-post evaluation as it is not possible to disentangle the
e⁄ects of automatic stabilizers, active ￿scal and monetary policy and behavioral responses like
changes in labor supply or disability bene￿t take-up.
3We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of auto-
matic stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest (forthcoming) and Buettner
and Fuest (2009).
2household income are concerned. When looking at the personal income tax only,
the values for the US are even higher than the EU average. Within the EU, there
is considerable heterogeneity, and results range from a value of 25% for Estonia to
56% for Denmark. In general automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Euro-
pean countries are considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European
countries. In the case of the unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between the EU
and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb 48% of the shock whereas the
stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%. Again, there is considerable heterogeneity
within the EU.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. For the income shock, the cushioning e⁄ect of auto-
matic stabilizers is now equal to 26% in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of
19%, which is again rather similar. For the unemployment shock, however, we ￿nd
a large di⁄erence. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 35% whereas the
value for the US (19%) is similar to the value for the income shock. These results
suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous systems of unemploy-
ment insurance in Europe, play a key role for demand stabilization and explain an
important part of the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the
US.
In the empirical literature on automatic stabilizers, two types of studies prevail:
macro (time series) studies and micro data estimates.4 Sachs and Sala-i Martin
(1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) use time series data and ￿nd values of
30%-40% for disposable income stabilization in the US. Other studies focus on the
relationship between output volatility, public sector size and openness of the econ-
omy (Cameron (1978), Gal￿ (1994), Rodrik (1998), van den Noord (2000), Auerbach
and Hassett (2002)). On the micro data side, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use the
NBER￿ s microsimulation model TAXSIM to estimate the automatic stabilization for
the US from 1962-95 and ￿nd values for the stabilization of disposable income rang-
ing between 25%-35%. Auerbach (2009) has updated this analysis and ￿nds a value
around 25% for more recent years. Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) conduct a similar
analysis for 15 European countries in 1998 and ￿nd higher stabilization e⁄ects than
4Early estimates on the responsiveness of the tax system to income ￿ uctuations are discussed
in the Appendix of Goode (1976). More recent contributions include Fat￿s and Mihov (2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), MØlitz and Zumer (2002).
3in the US, with results ranging from 32%-58%.5 How does this smoothing of dispos-
able income a⁄ect household demand? To the best of our knowledge, Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000) is the only simulation study which tries to estimate the demand
e⁄ect taking into account liquidity constraints. They also use the method suggested
by Zeldes (1989) and ￿nd that approximately two thirds of all households are likely
to be liquidity constrained. Given this, the contribution of automatic stabilizers to
demand smoothing is reduced to approximately 15% of the initial income shock.
What does the present paper contribute to this literature? Firstly, previous
studies have focused on proportional income shocks whereas our analysis shows that
automatic stabilizers work very di⁄erently in the case of unemployment shocks,
which a⁄ect households asymmetrically.6 Secondly, to the best of our knowledge,
our study is the ￿rst to estimate the prevalence of liquidity constraints for EU
household data.7 This is of key importance for assessing the role of automatic
stabilizers for demand smoothing. Thirdly, our analysis includes a decomposition
of the overall stabilization e⁄ects into the contributions of taxes, social insurance
contributions and bene￿ts. We show that this decomposition is important for the
comparison between the U.S. and Europe. Finally, a di⁄erence between our study
and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) as well as Auerbach (2009) is that we take into
account unemployment bene￿ts and state level income taxes. This explains why our
estimates of automatic stabilization e⁄ects in the US are higher.
A ￿nal issue we discuss in the paper is how ￿scal stimulus programs of individual
countries are related to automatic stabilizers. In particular, we ask whether coun-
tries with low automatic stabilizers have tried to compensate this by larger ￿scal
stimuli, but we ￿nd no correlation between the size of ￿scal stimulus programs and
automatic stabilizers. However, we ￿nd that active ￿scal policy is lower in more
open economies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the microsimulation mod-
5Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) rely for their analysis (which is a more recent version of Mabbett
(2004)) on the results from an in￿ ation scenario taken from Immvervoll et al. (2006) who use the
microsimulation model EUROMOD to increase earnings by 10% in order to simulate the sensitivity
of poverty indicators with respect to macro level changes.
6Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) do consider a shock where households at di⁄erent income
levels are a⁄ected di⁄erently, but the results are very similar to the case of a symmetric shock.
Our analysis con￿rms this for the US, but not for Europe.
7There are several studies on liquidity constraints and the responsiveness of households to tax
changes in for the US (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Johnson et al. (2006),
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009))
4els EUROMOD and TAXSIM. In addition, we discuss how stabilization e⁄ects can
be measured and describe the di⁄erent macro shock scenarios we consider. Section
3 presents the results on automatic stabilization which are discussed in Section 4
together with potential limitations of our approach. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, bene￿ts and disposable in-
come under di⁄erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households.
Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the pa-
rameters of interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon and
Spadaro (2006)). We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when
identifying the e⁄ects of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER￿ s microsimulation model
for calculating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individ-
ual data- and EUROMOD, a static tax-bene￿t model for 19 EU countries, which was
designed for comparative analysis.8 The models can simulate most direct taxes and
bene￿ts except those based on previous contributions as this information is usually
not available from the cross-sectional survey data used as input datasets. Informa-
tion on these instruments is taken directly from the original data sources. Both
models assume full bene￿t take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended
e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t systems. The main stages of the simulations are the following.
First, a micro-data sample and tax-bene￿t rules are read into the model. Then for
each tax and bene￿t instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment
units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount
of bene￿t or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and
bene￿ts in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
8For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see Sutherland
(2001, 2007). There are also country reports available with detailed information
on the input data, the modeling and validation of each tax bene￿t system, see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-bene￿t systems included in the model
have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-bene￿t
models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous applications (see, e.g.,
Bargain (2006)).
52.2 Income de￿nitions
Market income YM is de￿ned as the sum of all incomes from market activities:
YM = E + Q + I + P + O (1)
where E is earnings, Q business income, I capital income, P property income, and
O other income. Disposable income YD is de￿ned as market income minus net
government intervention G = T + S ￿ B :
YD = YM ￿ G = YM ￿ (T + S ￿ B) (2)
where T are direct taxes, S social insurance contributions, and B are social cash
bene￿ts (i.e. negative taxes).
2.3 Measurement of automatic stabilization
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the "normalized tax
change" used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as "the
tax system￿ s built-in ￿ exibility" (Pechman (1973, 1987)). It shows how changes in
market income translate into changes in disposable income. In the following we
simply refer to this measure as the income stabilization coe¢ cient ￿. We derive
￿ from a general functional relationship between disposable income and market
income:
￿ = ￿(YM;T;S;B): (3)
We compute ￿ using arithmetic changes (￿) in disposable income (￿YD) and market
income (￿YM) :
￿YD = (1 ￿ ￿)￿YM










￿T + ￿S ￿ ￿B
￿YM
(4)
It measures the sensitivity of disposable income, YD; with respect to market
income, YM. The higher ￿, the stronger the stabilization e⁄ect, e.g. ￿ = 0:4 implies
that 40% of the income shock is absorbed by the tax bene￿t system. Note that
the income stabilization coe¢ cient is not only determined by the size of government
(e.g. measured as expenditure or revenue in percent of GDP) but also depends on
6the structure of the tax bene￿t system and the design of the di⁄erent components.
Furthermore, it is important to explore the extent to which di⁄erent individual
components of the tax transfer system contribute to stabilization. Comparing tax
bene￿t systems in Europe and the US, we are interested in the weight of each
component in the respective country. We therefore decompose the coe¢ cient into














However, in order to stabilize ￿nal demand and output, the cushioning e⁄ect on
disposable income has to be transmitted to expenditures for goods and services. If
current demand depends on some concept of permanent income, demand will not
change in response to a transitory income shock. Things are di⁄erent, though, if
households are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow. In this case, their current
expenditures do depend on disposable income so that automatic stabilizers play a
role. Following Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), we assume that households who
face liquidity constraints fully adjust consumption expenditure after changes in dis-
posable income while no such behavior occurs among households without liquidity
constraints.9 The adjustment of liquidity constrained households takes place such
that changes in disposable income are equal to changes in consumption. Hence, the






where ￿CLQ denotes the consumption response of liquidity constrained house-
holds. In the following, we refer to ￿C as the demand stabilization coe¢ cient. In
order to explore the sensitivity of our estimates of the demand stabilization coe¢ -
cient with respect to the way in which liquidity constrained households are identi￿ed,
we choose two di⁄erent approaches. In the ￿rst one, we use the same approach as
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and follow Zeldes (1989) to split the samples accord-
ing to a speci￿c wealth to income ratio. A household is liquidity constrained if its
9Note that the term "liquidity constraint" does not have to be interpreted in an absolute
inability to borrow but can also come in a milder form of a substantial di⁄erence between borrowing
and lending rates which can result in distortions of the timing of purchases. Note further that our
demand stabilization coe¢ cient does not predict the overall change of ￿nal demand, but the extent
to which demand is stabilized by the tax bene￿t system.









The second approach simply considers the bottom 75% of the gross income dis-
tribution to be liquidity constrained.
2.4 Scenarios
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earn-
ings or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax bene￿t systems. In
the light of the current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn
scenario. Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) stress that recessions which follow a ￿nancial
crisis have particularly severe e⁄ects on asset prices, output and unemployment.
Therefore, we are interested not only in a scenario of an uniform decrease in in-
comes but also in an increase of the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario
where gross incomes are decreased by 5% (income shock) to a scenario where the
unemployment rate increases by ￿ve percentage points (unemployment shock).10
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our
samples.11 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed
with similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in e⁄ect, a fraction of employed house-
holds is made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control for several
individual and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unem-
ployed (see Appendix A.2). The implicit assumption behind this approach is that
10Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the current
crisis (see Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) for e⁄ects of previous crises). The (qualitative) results are
robust with respect to di⁄erent sizes of the shocks. It would be further possible to derive more
complicated scenarios with di⁄erent shocks on di⁄erent income sources or a combination of income
and unemployment shock. However, this would only have an impact on the distribution of changes
which are not relevant in the analysis of this paper. Therefore, we focus on these two simple
scenarios in order to make our analysis as simple as possible. One should note, though, that our
analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at quantifying the exact e⁄ects of the current
economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of
existing pre-crisis tax-bene￿t systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would include discretionary
government reactions and behavioral responses (see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for an empirical
ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we would not be able to identify
the role of automatic stabilization.
11For the reweigthing procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al. (2006), who have
also simulated an increase in unemployment through reweighting of the sample. Their analysis
focuses on changes in absolute and relative poverty rates after changes in the income distribution
and the employment rate.
8the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant.12
3 Results
3.1 US vs. Europe
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model in-
cludes 19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the ￿United
States of Europe￿ ). All of them are EU member states, which is why we refer to
this group as the EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries are missing.
We also consider the countries of the Euro area and refer to this group as ￿ Euro￿ .
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our baseline simulation, which focuses on the
income tax, social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees and
bene￿ts. Consider ￿rst the income shock. Approximately 38% of such a shock would
be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU (and Euroland). For the US, we
￿nd a slightly lower value of 32%. This di⁄erence of just six percentage points is
surprising in so far as automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually considered to be
drastically higher than in the US.13 Our results qualify this view to a certain degree,
at least as far as proportional income shocks are concerned. Figure 1 shows that
taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating factors which drive ￿ in
case of a uniform income shock. Bene￿ts are of minor importance in this scenario.
In the case of the unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between the EU and the
US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 48% of the shock (in the Euro
zone, we are close to 50%) whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%.
This di⁄erence can be explained with the importance of unemployment bene￿ts
which account for a large part of stabilization in Europe in this scenario. Table
4 in the Appendix shows that bene￿ts alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe
compared to just 7% in the US.
12Cf. Deville and S￿rndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). This approach is equivalent to
estimating probabilities of becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell and Blanch￿ ower (2009)) and then
selecting the individuals with the highest probabilities when controlling for the same characteristics
in the reweighting estimation (see Herault (2009)). The reweighting procedure is to some extent
sensitive to changes in control variables. However, this mainly a⁄ects the distribution of the shock
(which we do not analyze) and not the overall or mean e⁄ects which are important for the analysis
in this paper.
13Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coe¢ cient for the federal income tax only
is below 25% which is in line with the results of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? The
results for stabilization of aggregate demand are shown in Figure 2. The demand
stabilization coe¢ cients are lower than the income stabilization coe¢ cients since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households.
Therefore, the picture changes signi￿cantly. For the EU, the cushioning e⁄ect of
automatic stabilizers is now equal to 26%. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 19%, 7
percentage points less than for the EU. For the Euro area, where fewer households
are identi￿ed to be credit constrained, the demand stabilization coe¢ cient (24%)
is lower than for the EU-group. For the unemployment shock, the picture again
changes completely. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 35%, the Euro
area is slightly lower (34%), whereas the value for the US (19%) is close to the value
for the income shock. These results suggest that the transfers to the unemployed, in
particular the rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play
a key role for demand stabilization and drive the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers




















































Income Unemp. Income Unemp. Income Unemp.
Income Stabilization Demand Stabilization
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
between Europe and the US.
3.2 Country decomposition
The results for the stabilization coe¢ cient vary considerably across countries, as
can be seen from Figure 3 (and Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix). In the case of
the income shock, we ￿nd the highest stabilization coe¢ cient for Denmark, where
automatic stabilizers cushion 56% of the shock. Belgium (53%), Germany (48%)
and, surprisingly, Hungary (48%) also have strong automatic stabilizers. The lowest
values are found for Estonia (25%), Spain (28%) and Greece (29%). With the
exception of France, taxes seem to have a stronger stabilizing role than social security
contributions.
The picture again changes substantially in the case of the unemployment shock.
Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark (71%), followed by Sweden (69%),
11Austria (67%) Belgium (66%) and Germany (65%). The relatively low value of
stabilization from (unemployment) bene￿ts in Finland compared to its neighboring
Nordic countries might be surprising at a ￿rst glance but but can be explained
with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemployment bene￿ts of the
Nordic countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary (46%) is now below the EU
average (48%) due to the very low level of unemployment bene￿ts. At the other
end of the spectrum, there are some countries with values far below the US level
of 34%. These include Estonia (17%), Spain (28%), Poland (30%) and, to a lesser
extent, Italy (36%). The negative stabilization coe¢ cient for bene￿ts in Estonia and
Poland can be explained with the fact that the majority of bene￿ts is conditional
on working.




































































































Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
When looking at the personal income tax only, it is surprising that the values for
the US are higher than the EU average. This quali￿es to some extent the view that
12tax progressivity is higher in Europe. Of course, this can be partly explained with
the large heterogeneity within Europe. But still, only a few countries like Belgium,
Germany and the Nordic countries have higher contributions of stabilization coming
from the personal income tax.
How does this stabilization of disposable incomes a⁄ect household demand? In
most Eastern European countries, households are more likely to be credit constrained
than in Western Europe because ￿nancial wealth is typically lower. Our estimates
con￿rm this. For this reason automatic stabilizers will be more important for de-
mand stabilization in these countries. This explains why we ￿nd the highest modi￿ed
demand stabilization coe¢ cient for Hungary (46%) and why we ￿nd a stabilization
e⁄ect which is above or near to the EU average even for Poland (30%) and Estonia
(25%), although disposable income stabilization is below the EU average in these
countries. Relatively low values for automatic stabilization e⁄ects of the tax and
transfer systems on demand are now found in countries where households are rela-
tively wealthy, so that credit constraints are less important. These include Sweden,
with a stabilization coe¢ cient of 26%, Germany (25%) and in particular France
(16%). Our results, including those for other individual EU countries, are summa-
rized in Table 1.14
4 Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss a number of possible objections to and questions raised
by our analysis. These include the relation of our results to widely used macro
indicators of automatic stabilizers, the role of other taxes, the correlation between
automatic stabilizers and other macro variables like e.g. openness and, ￿nally, the
correlations between discretionary ￿scal stimulus programs and automatic stabilizers
as well as openness.
4.1 Stabilization coe¢ cients and simple macro indicators
One could argue that aggregate measures like e.g. the tax revenue to GDP ratio re-
veal su¢ cient information on the magnitude of automatic stabilizers in the di⁄erent
14The results are robust to other de￿nitions of liquidity constraints - at least with respect to
cross-country rankings (see also Appendix Table 5). Of course, the higher the share of liquidity
constrained households the higher ￿C:
13Table 1: Stabilization of aggregate demand
Share liquidity constrained Income shock Unemployment shock
Population Income ￿ Income ￿C Demand ￿ Income ￿C Demand
AT 0.891 0.883 0.439 0.388 0.670 0.606
BE 0.706 0.639 0.527 0.348 0.657 0.466
DK 0.619 0.576 0.558 0.320 0.707 0.470
EE 0.984 0.969 0.253 0.246 0.168 0.162
FI 0.741 0.629 0.396 0.266 0.541 0.385
FR 0.479 0.420 0.370 0.161 0.582 0.341
GE 0.511 0.503 0.481 0.248 0.645 0.376
GR 0.854 0.822 0.291 0.234 0.383 0.310
HU 0.976 0.961 0.476 0.457 0.464 0.452
IR 0.736 0.646 0.363 0.228 0.425 0.315
IT 0.762 0.733 0.346 0.283 0.359 0.268
LU 0.773 0.768 0.374 0.284 0.533 0.419
NL 0.706 0.657 0.397 0.264 0.472 0.348
PL 0.985 0.982 0.301 0.296 0.295 0.288
PT 0.899 0.886 0.303 0.273 0.625 0.589
SI 0.743 0.632 0.317 0.112 0.425 0.245
SP 0.837 0.824 0.277 0.225 0.283 0.230
SW 0.630 0.599 0.420 0.257 0.685 0.501
UK 0.824 0.775 0.352 0.277 0.441 0.397
EU 0.717 0.686 0.378 0.258 0.482 0.350
EURO 0.657 0.626 0.385 0.242 0.504 0.339
USA 0.777 0.536 0.322 0.194 0.337 0.189
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Note: A household is de￿ned as liquidity constrained if its capitalized wealth is less than
the disposable income of at least two months (cf. Zeldes (1989)).
countries. For instance, the IMF (2009) has recently used aggregate tax to GDP
ratios as proxies for the size of automatic stabilizers in G-20 countries. The upper
panel of Figure 4 depicts the relation between the ratio of average revenue 2006-2010
to GDP and the income stabilization coe¢ cient for the proportional income shock.15
With a correlation of 0.58, one can conclude that government size is indeed a good
predictor for the amount of automatic stabilization. The picture changes, however,
if stabilization of aggregate household demand is considered, i.e. if we account for
15All ￿gures and correlations in this section are population-weighted in order to control for
di⁄erent country sizes. However, results are similar to those without population-weighting. We
also obtained similar results when using the government spending to GDP ratio instead of revenue
as a measure of the size of the government.
14liquidity constraints. As shown in Figure 4 (lower panel), with a coe¢ cient of 0.33
government size and stabilization of aggregate household demand are only weakly
correlated.16
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Average annual revenue to GDP, 2007-2010
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
These simple correlations suggest that macro indicators like tax revenue to GDP
ratios are meaningful indicators for the stabilization e⁄ect of the tax and transfer
system on disposable income but can be misleading as indicators of the stabilization
e⁄ect on household demand. The reason is that the latter depends on the presence of
liquidity constraints. The income share of liquidity constrained households, however,
is negatively correlated with the size of government. In our analysis, we ￿nd a
correlation of -0.30 (see also Figure 7 in the Appendix).
Another interesting point arises from Figure 4 when making vertical comparisons
between similar countries. For instance, Denmark and Sweden, and - to some extent
16The respective correlations for the unemployment shock are 0.72 and 0.52.
15- Belgium and France have similar levels of revenue to GDP ratios. However, the
stabilization is higher in Denmark and Belgium. In both countries, the importance
of the (progressive) income tax is higher, whereas Sweden and France rely more on
proportional social insurance contributions. Therefore, not only the size but also the
structure of the tax bene￿t system are important for its possibilities of automatic
stabilization.
4.2 The role of other taxes
Another objection to our results could be that we neglect some taxes which are po-
tentially relevant as automatic stabilizers. These include consumption taxes like the
value added tax or sales taxes, social insurance contributions or payroll taxes paid
by employers, corporate income taxes and other taxes like e.g. property transaction
taxes. Including some of these taxes like employer social insurance contributions
or even consumption taxes would be possible technically. But the interpretation of
these numbers would be less straightforward. Our measure of automatic stabiliza-
tion e⁄ects refers to a counterfactual without taxes. We have assumed implicitly
that market prices and wages would be the same in the absence of taxes. If we ap-
ply this to consumption taxes and employer social insurance contributions or payroll
taxes, these taxes would stabilize corporate income, as does the corporate income
tax.17 The stabilization of cash ￿ ows of corporations has implications for aggregate
demand which di⁄er substantially from the implications of stabilizing household dis-
posable income, and analyzing these implications would be beyond the scope of this
paper.18
4.3 Automatic stabilizers and openness
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilizers di⁄er signi￿cantly
within Europe. In particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Euro-
pean countries are much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing
to this is that government size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes,
17Due to a lack of space, we do not discuss these results here in more detail. But given these
assumptions, the di⁄erence in the stabilization e⁄ect between the EU and the US would increase.
This is due to the fact that EU countries have on average higher consumption taxes (and social
insurance contributions) than the US states (see, e.g., European Commission (2009b) and McIntyre
et al. (2003)).
18This issue is discussed in Devereux and Fuest (forthcoming) and Buettner and Fuest (2009).
16at least in Europe. The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher
in high income countries, just as a side e⁄ect of a larger public sector.
But di⁄erences in automatic stabilizers across countries may also have other rea-
sons. In particular, the e⁄ectiveness of demand stabilization as a way of stabilizing
domestic output is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open economies, do-
mestic output will depend heavily on export demand and higher demand by domestic
households will partly lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness of the economy has
a number of other implications for the tax and transfer system, including the view
that more open economies need more insurance against shocks as argued, e.g., by
Rodrik (1998). Figure 5 depicts the relationship between income stabilization coef-
￿cients and openness as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP.
As graph 5 shows, it is not the case that more open economies have weaker auto-
matic stabilizers, the correlation is even positive (0.57). Our results thus support
the hypothesis of Rodrik (1998) that income stabilization is higher in more open
economies. For the demand stabilization coe¢ cient, we ￿nd a similar correlation.
4.4 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary ￿scal policy
In the debate on ￿scal policy responses to the crisis, some countries have been
criticized for being reluctant to enact ￿scal stimulus programs in order to stabilize
demand, in particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to point to the
fact that automatic stabilizers in Germany are more important than in other coun-
tries, so that less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of
whether countries with weaker automatic stabilizers have taken more discretionary
￿scal policy action. To shed some light on this issue, we relate the size of ￿scal
stimulus programs to stabilization coe¢ cients.
Graph 6 shows that income stabilization coe¢ cients are largely uncorrelated to
the size of ￿scal stimulus programs (-0.10). A positive, albeit also rather small
correlation emerges when we consider demand stabilization coe¢ cients (see Graph
8 in the Appendix). Our ￿nding of a small correlation between automatic stabilizers
and discretionary measures quali￿es the view that countries with lower automatic
stabilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action (e.g., IMF (2009),
p. 27).
A further concern in the policy debate put forward by supporters of large and
coordinated discretionary measures is that countries could limit the size of their pro-
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, Heston et al. (2006).
grams at the expense of countries with more generous ￿scal policy responses. The
idea behind this argument is that some countries might show a free-rider behavior
and pro￿t from spill-over e⁄ects of discretionary measures.19 Therefore, we inves-
tigate the hypothesis if more open countries which are supposed to bene￿t more
from spill-over e⁄ects indeed passed smaller stimulus programs. We ￿nd a negative
correlation of -0.40 between the average annual discretionary measures in 2009 and
2010 and the coe¢ cient for openness which supports the hypothesis.20
Table 2 shows the results of the regression of discretionary measures taken by the
EU-19 countries and the USA on the income stabilization coe¢ cients, a measure of
openness of the respective economies and their governments￿budget balance in 2007.
Openness is again measured as the average ratio of exports and imports to GDP from
19In that sense, a ￿scal stimulus program can be seen as a positive externality since potential
positive e⁄ects are not limited to the country of origin.
20Cf. Graph 9 in the Appendix.
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Income stabilization coefficient
Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009c), IMF (2009) and International Labour O¢ ce and International Institute for
Labour Studies (2009).
2000-2004. Due to the very small sample size, this inference should be interpreted
with caution. Having this in mind, the coe¢ cients of openness and the budget
balance are signi￿cant indicating that in addition to the argument above about
openness, some governments have been constrained by weak budget positions in
their decision making about discretionary ￿scal policy. The insigni￿cant relationship
between discretionary ￿scal policy and the amount of automatic stabilization is also
con￿rmed by the regression.
19Table 2: Explanatory factors of disretionary ￿scal policy
dep. var.: ￿scal stimulus 2009-10 (1) (2) (3)




Budget balance 2007 0.149*
(0.07)
Constant 0.018** 0.019*** 0.017**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
adjusted R2 0.011 0.160 0.353
F 0.193 3.420 2.912
N 20 20 20
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Note: standard error in parentheses. signi￿cance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have used the microsimulation models for the tax and transfer sys-
tems of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investigate
the extent to which automatic stabilizers cushion household disposable income and
household demand in the event of macroeconomic shocks. Our analysis has focused
on the personal income tax, employee social insurance contributions and bene￿ts.
One of the key ￿ndings of our analysis is that the amount of automatic stabilization
depends strongly on the type of income shock. In the case of a proportional income
shock, approximately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers
in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 32%. Within the EU, there is considerable
heterogeneity, and results range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% for Den-
mark. In general automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries
are considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European countries.
In the case of an unemployment shock, which a⁄ects households asymmetrically,
the di⁄erence between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb
48% of the shock whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34%. Again, there
is considerable heterogeneity within the EU.
These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous sys-
tems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for the stabilization of
20disposable incomes and household demand and explain a large part of the di⁄erence
in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. This is con￿rmed by the de-
composition of stabilization e⁄ects in our analysis. In the case of the unemployment
shocks, bene￿ts alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in
the US, whereas the stabilizing e⁄ect of income taxes (taking into account State
taxes in the US as well) is similar. This quali￿es to some extent the view that the
tax wedge is larger in Europe than in the US. This is only true when looking at the
high tax countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany or Sweden.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. For the income shock, the cushioning e⁄ect of auto-
matic stabilizers is now equal to 26% in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 19%,
which is again rather similar. The value for the Euro area (24%) is close to the value
for the EU. For the unemployment shock, however, we ￿nd a large di⁄erence. In
the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 35% whereas the value for the US (19%)
is close to the value for the income shock.
Does this mean that the US economy is particularly vulnerable to the current
economic crisis? To the extent that wages are more ￿ exible than in Europe, one could
hope that fewer jobs will be lost in the crisis, so that the proportional income scenario
is more relevant. But US labor markets are also characterized by less employment
protection, so that job losses occur more quickly. For instance, between April 2008
and April 2009, the US unemployment rate increased by 3.9 percentage points while
the unemployment rate in the Euro area only increased by less than two percentage
points. There is much less automatic stabilization of disposable incomes as well as
household consumption demand than in Europe.
A second major result from our analysis is that demand stabilization di⁄ers
considerably from disposable income stabilization. This has important policy im-
plications, also for discretionary ￿scal policy. As low income households are more
likely to be liquidity constrained and have a higher propensity of spending an in-
come increase, policies aimed at those households should lead to higher stabilizing
e⁄ects. If liquidity constraints are low, reducing tax rates in order to tackle the
crisis will not be successful in increasing aggregate demand (see also Shapiro and
Slemrod (2009)). In this case, increasing government expenditure might me a more
successful way of tackling the crisis.
A third important result of our analysis is that automatic stabilizers are very
21heterogenous within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European coun-
tries are characterized by rather low automatic stabilizers. This is surprising, at
least from an insurance point of view because lower average income (and wealth)
implies that households are more vulnerable to income shocks. One explanation
for this ￿nding could be that countries with lower per capita incomes tend to have
smaller public sectors. From this perspective, weaker automatic stabilizers in East-
ern and Southern European countries are a potentially unintended side e⁄ect of the
lower demand for government activity including redistribution. Another potential
explanation, the idea that more open economies have weaker automatic stabilizers
because domestic demand spills over to other countries, seems to be inconsistent with
the data, at least as far as the simple correlation between stabilization coe¢ cients
and trade to GDP ratios is concerned.
Finally, we have discussed the claim that countries with smaller automatic sta-
bilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action. According to our
results, there is no correlation between ￿scal stimulus programs of individual coun-
tries and stabilization coe¢ cients. However, we ￿nd that more open countries and
countries with higher budget de￿cits have passed smaller stimulus programs. All
in all, our results suggest that policymakers did not take into account the forces
of automatic stabilizers when designing active ￿scal policy measures to tackle the
current economic crisis.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our
analysis. Firstly, the role of tax and transfer systems for stabilizing household
demand, not just disposable income, is based on strong assumptions on the link
between disposable income and household expenditures. Although we have used
what we believe to be the best available method for estimating liquidity constraints,
considerable uncertainty remains as to whether this method leads to an appropriate
description of household behavior. Secondly, our analysis abstracts from automatic
stabilization through other taxes, in particular consumption taxes, employer social
insurance contributions and payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. Thirdly, we
have abstracted from the role of labor supply or other behavioral adjustments for the
impact of automatic stabilizers. We intend to pursue these issues in future research.
22A Appendix:
A.1 Additional results
Table 3: Decomposition income scenario
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN TaxSicBen
AT 0.294 0.000 0.139 0.006 0.439
BE 0.382 0.000 0.131 0.014 0.527
DK 0.455 0.000 0.086 0.018 0.558
EE 0.228 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.253
FI 0.340 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.396
FR 0.153 0.000 0.181 0.036 0.370
GE 0.351 0.000 0.118 0.012 0.481
GR 0.203 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.291
HU 0.307 0.000 0.160 0.009 0.476
IR 0.310 0.000 0.039 0.014 0.363
IT 0.254 0.000 0.079 0.013 0.346
LU 0.265 0.000 0.097 0.012 0.374
NL 0.270 0.000 0.116 0.011 0.397
PL 0.168 0.000 0.118 0.015 0.301
PT 0.203 0.000 0.090 0.010 0.303
SI 0.289 0.000 0.031 0.028 0.317
SP 0.240 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.277
SW 0.368 0.000 0.040 0.012 0.420
UK 0.267 0.000 0.054 0.031 0.352
EU 0.260 0.000 0.100 0.017 0.378
EURO 0.263 0.000 0.108 0.015 0.385
USA 0.240 0.049 0.039 -0.006 0.322
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
23Table 4: Decomposition unemployment scenario
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN TaxSicBen
AT 0.200 0.000 0.167 0.303 0.670
BE 0.257 0.000 0.124 0.276 0.657
DK 0.243 0.000 0.083 0.382 0.707
EE 0.178 0.000 0.022 -0.032 0.168
FI 0.224 0.000 0.050 0.267 0.541
FR 0.076 0.000 0.190 0.317 0.582
GE 0.231 0.000 0.145 0.268 0.645
GR 0.126 0.000 0.137 0.119 0.383
HU 0.227 0.000 0.190 0.047 0.464
IR 0.207 0.000 0.036 0.182 0.425
IT 0.183 0.000 0.101 0.076 0.359
LU 0.147 0.000 0.090 0.296 0.533
NL 0.103 0.000 0.131 0.239 0.472
PL 0.151 0.000 0.170 -0.027 0.295
PT 0.225 0.000 0.094 0.306 0.625
SI 0.175 0.000 0.216 0.054 0.425
SP 0.127 0.000 0.064 0.091 0.283
SW 0.197 0.000 0.029 0.458 0.685
UK 0.194 0.000 0.061 0.186 0.441
EU 0.172 0.000 0.121 0.189 0.482
EURO 0.166 0.000 0.129 0.210 0.504
USA 0.174 0.041 0.051 0.071 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
24Table 5: Stabilization of aggregate demand
Share liquidity constrained Income shock Unemployment shock
Population Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income
AT 0.750 0.408 0.172 0.439 0.396 0.670
BE 0.750 0.352 0.190 0.527 0.368 0.657
DK 0.750 0.387 0.205 0.558 0.392 0.707
EE 0.750 0.350 0.087 0.253 0.073 0.168
FI 0.750 0.364 0.136 0.396 0.314 0.541
FR 0.750 0.379 0.143 0.370 0.383 0.582
GE 0.750 0.374 0.172 0.481 0.366 0.645
GR 0.750 0.355 0.066 0.291 0.156 0.383
HU 0.750 0.322 0.120 0.476 0.151 0.464
IR 0.750 0.409 0.130 0.363 0.260 0.425
IT 0.750 0.372 0.116 0.346 0.139 0.359
LU 0.750 0.413 0.131 0.374 0.345 0.533
NL 0.750 0.467 0.168 0.397 0.283 0.472
PL 0.750 0.328 0.099 0.301 0.093 0.295
PT 0.750 0.371 0.083 0.303 0.216 0.625
SI 0.750 0.355 0.077 0.317 0.154 0.425
SP 0.750 0.408 0.091 0.277 0.147 0.283
SW 0.750 0.400 0.162 0.420 0.456 0.685
UK 0.750 0.388 0.133 0.352 0.260 0.441
EU 0.750 0.378 0.133 0.378 0.260 0.482
EURO 0.750 0.384 0.136 0.385 0.277 0.504
USA 0.750 0.310 0.089 0.322 0.128 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Note: Bottom 75% of
gross income distribution are assumed to be liquidity constrained.
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
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Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009c), IMF (2009).
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Source: Heston et al. (2006), European Commission (2009c), International Labour O¢ ce
and International Institute for Labour Studies (2009) and IMF (2009).
27A.2 Reweighting procedure for increasing unemployment
In order to increase the unemployment rate while keeping the aggregate counts of
other key individual and household characteristics constant, we follow the approach
taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006). The increase of the unemployment rates is mod-
eled through reweighting of our samples while controlling for several individual and
household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed.
We follow Immvervoll et al. (2006) and de￿ne the unemployed as people aged
19￿ 59 declaring themselves to be out of work and looking for a job. The within-
database national ￿ unemployment rate￿is calculated as the ratio of these unemployed
to those in the labor force, de￿ned as the unemployed plus people aged 19￿ 59 who
are (self)employed. The increased total number of unemployed people is calculated
by adding 5 percentage points to the ￿ unemployment rate￿within each country.
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national data-
bases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di⁄erential non-
response (see Sutherland (2001) for details). Weights are then recalculated using the
existing weights as a starting point, but (a) using the increased (decreased) num-
ber of unemployed (employed) people as the control totals for them, and (b) also
controlling for individual demographic and household composition variables using
the existing grossed-up totals for these categories as control totals. The speci￿c
variables used as controls are:
￿ employment status
￿ age (0￿ 18, 19￿ 24, 25￿ 49, 50￿ 59, 60+)
￿ gender
￿ marital status and household size
￿ education
￿ region
This method implies that the households without any unemployed people that
are similar to households with unemployed people (according to the above variables)
will have their weights reduced. In other words, these are the households who are
￿ made unemployed￿in our exercise.
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